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LABOR LAw - LMRA- STATUS OF UNION OFFICIAL AS AN "EMPLOYEE 
REPRESENTATIVE" FOR PURPOSES OF PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 302 -The 
appellant was president of the International Longshoreman's Association, 
the recognized bargaining agent for longshore labor in the Port of New York. 
An officer of several of the employer members of the New York Shipping 
Association paid the appellant $5500 in six yearly "Christmas presents." 
The appellant was convicted1 of violating section 302 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, which makes it a misdemeanor for "any representative 
of any employees" to receive or agree to receive money from his employer, 
subject to certain exceptions.2 On appeal, held, reversed. The word "rep-
resentative" is a term of art used throughout the act to mean a collective 
bargaining representative. Although the appellant is an officer of the 
union, the union itself is the collective bargaining agent. United States v. 
Ryan, (2d Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 417, cert. granted 350 U.S. 860, 76 S.Ct. 
103 (1955). 
In 1946 the United Mine Workers demanded an employer-supported 
union welfare fund with no restrictions on the discretion of the union 
officials who administered it. As a result of this demand, section 302 of the 
Taft-Hartley Act was enacted.3 Prior to the lower court decision in the 
principal case, most of the adjudicated problems under this section involved 
welfare funds.4 The principal case is the most prominent of a new group of 
cases in which the government has utilized the criminal sanctions of section 
302 in an effort to curb employer bribes to union leaders.5 Bribes to union 
members or officers were previously dealt with as employer unfair labor 
practices under the National Labor Relations Act.6 The problem which has 
1 (D.C. N.Y. 1955) 128 F. Supp. 128. 
2 61 Stat. L 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §186. 
3 See 93 CONG. REc. 4746-4747, 4678 (1947). 
4 E.g.: United Marine Division v. Essex Transportation Co., (3d Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 
410; William Dunbar Co. v. Painters &: 'Glaziers District Council, (D.C. D.C. 1955) 129 
F. Supp. 417; United Garment Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, (D.C. Pa. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 
49. The only other section 302 cases involved union checkoff procedures. See, e.g., State 
v. Montgomery Ward, 120 Utah 294,233 P. (2d) 685 (1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 869, 72 S.Ct. 
lll (1951). 
5 Other· cases in the series are United States v. Connelly, (D.C. Minn. 1955) 129 F. 
Supp. 786, and United States v. Brennan, (D.C. Minn. 1955) 28 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[69,457. 
6 See, e.g.: West Kentucky Coal Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 88 (1938) (union officers promised 
a building for their personal use); Armory Garment Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 182 (1948) 
(attempted bribe to influence employee not to testify); E. A. Laboratories, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 
625 (1948) (union leader offered position in company union). There has been no success-
ful use of section 302 in extortion cases, probably because this offense, involving as it 
does the use of force or fear, is already interdicted by the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act 
and the Anti-Kickback Act. Compare United States v. Connelly, note 5 supra, at 789, 
with the principal case at 424. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §1951, is directed at ex-
tortion from an employer. In Bianchi v. United States, (8th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 182, 
cert. den. 349 U.S. 915, 75 S.Ct. 604 (1955), the court clearly indicates that the Hobbs 
Act covers entirely separate ground from the bribery encompassed by section 302 of Taft-
Hartley. See also United States v. Dale, (7th Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 181. The Anti-Kick-
back Act, 18 U.S.C. (1952) §874, is directed at the foreman who extorts money from em-
ployees. See, e.g.: United States v. Carbone, 327 U.S. 633, 66 S.Ct. 734 (1946); United 
States v. Price, (D.C. Tenn. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 593. 
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split the courts in the new cases under section 302 is that of defining "rep-
resentative." There are two diametrically opposed views on this problem. 
One is that the term "representative" includes not only any collective bar-
gaining representative but also a union officer.7 The arguments for this 
view are primarily: (I) the Taft-Hartley Act's preamble shows that one of 
the purposes of the act was to eliminate detrimental practices of unions 
and union officers;8 (2) the general definition of "representative" as in-
cluding "any individual or labor organization"9 does not exclude the use 
of the word in its ordinary non-collective bargaining sense; (3) viewing the . 
act as a whole, the term "representative" is almost invariably qualified by 
the addition of such words as "collective bargaining,"19 and this indicates 
tha~ Congress intended a simple meaning £pr the unqualified term;11 (4) 
the crucial words of section 302 (b)-"any representative of any employees"12 
-were often interpreted in congressional debates as meaning "union repre-
sentative" ;13 (5) an attempt to limit the term to "collective bargaining rep-
resentatives" would exclude some of the very individuals Congress princi-
pally intended to regulate, i.e., the welfare fund trustees who are obviously 
not engaged in collective bargaining.14 The second view is that "representa-
tive" includes only those engaged in collective bargaining under the pro-
visions of section 9 of the amended NLRA,15 and ilot union officers as such. 
The arguments for this view, as presented in the principal case, are (I) a 
specific definition of "representative" which could have been interpreted 
to include union officers was omitted from the final act;16 (2) the term 
"representative" is used throughout the act as a term of art to indicate an 
exclusive collective bargaining representative;17 (3) since the primary pur-
pose of section 302 was to regulate union welfare funds, the words of the 
7 This view is adhered to by Judge Hand who dissented in the principal case, Judge 
Palmieri who wrote the lower court opinion in the principal case, and Judge Devitt 
in United States v. Brennan, note 5 supra. 
s Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 137, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §151. 
o 61 Stat. L. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §152 (4). Compare the discussions on the 
semantics of this definition in the majority and minority opinions· of the principal case. 
10 E.g.: 61 Stat. L. 140-144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§157, 158 (a) and (d), 159 (a), (b) 
and (c). 
11 "Representative" is used by itself, in a non-collective bargaining sense, in several 
sections of the act. E.g.: 61 Stat. L. 141, 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§158 (b) (I) (B), 
181 (a) and (b). 
12 It should be noted that "any" is not used to modify "representative" elsewhere 
in the Taft-Hartley Act. Cf. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 at 58, 69 S.Ct. 959 (1949), where 
heavy emphasis is placed upon the broad effect of the word "any." 
13 See, e.g.: remarks of Senator Taft, 93 CoNG. REc. 4746 (1947); remarks of Senator 
Byrd, 92 CONG. REc. 4891, 4900 (1946). 
14 This argument was well received in United States v. Brennan, note 5 supra. 
15 61 Stat. L. 143 (1947), 29 U,.S.C. (1952) §159. 
16 Section 302 (g) of Senator Byrd's proposal contained this definition. 92 CONG. REc. 
5040-5041 (1946). However, it was replaced by a reference to the definition cited in note 
9 supra. 
17 But see the instances cited in note 11 supra. 
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section should not be ex.tended to include bribery of union officers. The 
court in the principal case made no reference to the fact that the appellant 
was not only the union's president but also an important member of its 
wage scale committee, which did the collective bargaining for the union. 
By contrast, the lower court emphasized this fact as an indication that this 
"representative," more than any other, must have been of the kind which 
Congress intended to include within the terms of section 302.18 The Second 
Circuit either ignored this fact, in order to avoid the necessity of drawing 
a future line based on a union officer's importance, or it simply did not · 
wish to ex.tend the criminal sanctions of section 302 into an area already 
regulated by other Iegislation.19 
George E. Ewing 
18 Note I supra, at 132. 
19 See note 6 supra and adjacent text. 
